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The increasing defrost in Arctic ice layer has been causing great concern among 
environmentalists. On the other hand, the actual possibility of decreasing the 
amount of ice in the Arctic opens up a set of new perspectives for the region, 
both for countries bordering the area and for the ones elsewhere. Within the 
second list, a certain state deserves particular attention: China. 
Which Chinese strategic interests justify the great attention this 
country gives to the Arctic scene? A first answer to this question states that 
China, as a global major player, is virtually interested in all regions and in all 
kinds of matters. However, two of these issues especially draw China’s attention 
to the region: exploitation of natural resources and the opening of new 
commercial maritime routes.  
Nevertheless, given the particularities in Arctic’s geopolitical scene, 
China has to practice a much cautious diplomacy in the region, and it has been 
doing exactly that, both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis. 
 
 
2. The Arctic’s geopolitical scenario 
Different from what occurs in Antarctica – where there is an extensive landmass 
– the situation in the Arctic is deeply influenced by the Arctic Ocean and a few 
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closer seas. In this sense, a distinct feature of this ocean is that it resembles a 
semi-enclosed sea, having a small gateway with the north of the Pacific Ocean 
(Bering Strait) and a deeper and larger one next to the North Atlantic Ocean 
(Fram Strait). Because of this distinctive character some scholars refer to the 
Arctic Ocean as a “Polar Mediterranean”. Moreover, the permanent presence of 
a thin ice layer over the ocean is typical in this region (Rothwell 1996, 35-36). 
In comparison with the Antarctic, the Arctic is also distinct since the 
former is part of an existing legal framework, as exemplified by the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) and its legal instruments, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959 and the Madrid Protocol of 1991. The existence of such internationally 
recognized legal framework in the South Pole encouraged the proposal for 
establishing a similar juridical structure for the Arctic. This possibility, 
nonetheless, displeases some main actors in the Arctic. 
The set of Arctic states can be organized according two groups: the A-5 
and the A-8. The former refers to those states that have their shore pointed 
towards the inside of the Arctic Ocean, which are: Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), the United States (Alaska), the Russian Federation and Norway. 
The second group of states, A-8, is composed by all those five plus Finland, 
Iceland and Sweden, which are located within the Arctic Circle2.  
Against this territorially confined and environmentally inhospitable 
background, two major global actors confront each other: the United States and 
the Russian Federation. Great enemies during the Cold War period, the U.S. 
and the former U.S.S.R. neighbor each other in the Arctic region. Not even the 
isolation and remoteness of the Arctic were enough to keep these two 
superpowers from building their air-stripes, radar stations and acoustic devices 
for detection of submarines. At the time of the Cold War, the possibility that 
nuclear submarines could use the route underneath the ice cap in order to pass 
through the Arctic to the Atlantic, brought some considerable attention to the 
region (Byers 2009, 59-60). 
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During the process of political openness introduced by the soviet 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Arctic experienced the easing of 
tensions surrounding the region. In 1987, the launching of the Murmansk 
Initiative called for a wide cooperation in the region, in terms of trade, 
environment, culture and arms control. Later on, this Initiative lead to the idea 
about the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy – AEPS and to the 
establishment of a new system of governance, with the creation of the Arctic 
Council (Numminen 2010, 86). 
In the following years, influenced by the end of the Cold War, 
cooperation among the eight countries in the region gradually started to 
increase. This led to the Ottawa Declaration of September 1996, establishing 
the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum whose main goal is:  
 
[t]o provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic 
Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic 
issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic. 
 
Some people consider that this stage of cooperation within the A-8 
group was put into question when, in the 2007 North hemisphere's summer, two 
unmanned Russian midget submarines attached a stainless titanium flag 
underneath the ice cap in the North Pole, to a measured depth of 4,262 meters. 
This event aroused fierce political reactions, especially coming from Canada and 
from the United States. In the media and among scholars, the Russian action 
brought up renewed fears that a new “(Truly) Cold War” was about to begin. 
These suspicions were aggravated by the fact that, in the absence of a general 
international treaty on the Arctic, this region resembled an anarchic zone, 
subjected to the geopolitical will of the neighbor countries and other interested 
parts. 
The lack of a comprehensive convention especially oriented to the issues 
of the Arctic rise two opposing statements, although they are not in conflict 
with each other at the moment. On the one hand, there are the non-Arctic 
states, which fear their interests might be jeopardized, once they are excluded 
from processes of negotiations and decision-making within the region. The 
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opening of new commercial routes, for instance, could hamper these countries' 
commercial benefits. On the other hand, the Arctic states do not seem very 
thrilled with the idea of devising a legal framework for the region. In this sense, 
the A-5 constitutes a subgroup within the eight countries that form the Arctic 
Council. Besides rejecting the necessity of a treaty, the A-5 clearly manifested 
its position when stating that a widely accepted legal instrument applied to the 
Arctic already exists, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). 
The main reason why the A-5 group is interested in applying the 
UNCLOS to the Arctic is due the possibility of extending their continental 
shelves, which is, the seabed and the subsoil of the underwater landmasses that 
extend beyond the limits of the territorial sea. According to the Article 76 in the 
Convention, every coastal state holds the right to a continental shelf of 200 
nautical miles, a limit that can be extended. In order to do so, the coastal state 
must provide information on the limits of the continental shelf – beyond the 
200 nautical miles to a maximum of 350 nautical miles – to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an organ created by UNCLOS itself. 
After examining the gathered information, the Commission will give “definitive 
and mandatory” recommendations that will serve as a basis for establishing the 
external limits of the continental shelf. 
The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed only by the countries of the A-
5 group, albeit not explicitly mentioning the UNCLOS, makes clear that the 
international law of the sea applies satisfactorily to the Arctic Ocean. It 
registers that: 
 
By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large 
areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position 
[…] In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal 
framework applies to the Arctic Ocean […] Notably, the law of the sea 
provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine 
scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this 
legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping 
claims. This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible 






management by the five coastal states and other users of this Ocean 
through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. 
We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international 
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. 
 
One must regard that the Russian-led event was not sufficient to create 
animosities among the other members of A-5. The action happened in the midst 
of Arktika 2007 expedition and served the purpose of collecting more data that 
could be used to better support the Russian proposal for an extended 
continental shelf in the Arctic. The media reaction did not follow the political 
unfolding in the Arctic scene, which has been of great cooperation among 
countries of the North Pole. Another example demonstrating the positive 
relations among countries of the Arctic region was the signature of an 
agreement between the Russian Federation and Norway in September 2010 
about marine limits and cooperation in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic 
Ocean. The agreement between these two countries brought an end to four 
decades of negotiations over the matter.  
Yet, this cooperation and seemingly harmony among countries of the 
region reinforces the concerns of non-Arctic states over the creation of an 
“exclusive club” for the Arctic countries, which could solely decide upon the 
course of the region. In this regard, China's position is disadvantageous, once 
this country does not feature a coastline facing the Arctic Ocean, nor is located 
within the boundaries of the Arctic Circle, and neither could it be placed within 
any other criteria used to determine the region. This situation seems to have 
compelled the Chinese to a kind of “geographical stretching”, in which they 
refer China as a “near Arctic State” and assign themselves “stakeholders” in the 
region (SIPRI 2012). 
The growing interest of the Chinese government in the North Pole is 
mainly justified by the necessity of researching the consequences that climate 
change brings to the Arctic region. The air stream coming from the Arctic seems 
to be one of the main causes behind the severe climate impacts China has 
experienced in the last few years. Thus, the climate effects with origin in the 
Arctic are a cause of great economic and social worry for China's development 
and security (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 83). 
China also looks towards the Arctic v.3, n.6. Jul./Dec. 2014 
 
100  
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations | v.3, n.6, Jul./Dec. 2014 
 
Besides these factors there are, at least, two other reasons that justify a 
careful look from China over the Arctic: exploitation of natural resources and 
the opening of new commercial maritime routes. 
 
 
3. Exploitation of natural resources 
Scientists might disagree over the causes of global warming, but it is undeniable 
that the rising temperatures have accelerated the defrosting process on the 
Arctic. Some people guess that during the summer of 2040 there will be 
virtually no ice in the North Pole, and that the warming up of the Arctic has 
already past crossed the point of no return. This way, exploitation of oil, 
natural gas and other reserves in the region starts to become technically and 
economically viable, shifting from simple work of fiction to become a close 
reality (Rajabov 2009, 420-428). 
According to estimates of the U.S. Geological Survey (2008) the amount 
of uncovered oil and natural gas in the Arctic could reach the level of 90 billion 
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion liquid barrels 
of natural gas, wherein 84% are found in oceanic zones. The totality of this 
supply could account for up to 30% of the world unknown natural gas reserves, 
or even 13% in the case of oil. Besides oil and gas, another important economic 
feature present in the Arctic is the extraction of ores, such as nickel, copper, 
tungsten, zinc, gold, silver, manganese and titanium. 
For China, which is a major importer of oil, the opening of a new and 
promising energy scenario in the Arctic is very attractive. Since 1993, when 
China became a net importer of oil, its dependency on foreign market suppliers 
highly increased. It is estimated that Chinese consumption of oil nears ten 
million barrels a day, half of it being imported, while future projections outline 
an even sharper scenario. According to the latest report from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), by 2020 China will have become the premier oil importer 
in the entire world, surpassing the United States and becoming the main 
consumer of this natural resource in 2030 (IEA 2013, 1-5; Rainwater 2013, 64). 
In order to join the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic, 
China will need to establish partnerships with foreign companies, especially 
Russian ones (i.e.: Gazprom, Rosneft) that already control several areas for 
exploitation within the Exclusive Economic Zone belonging to the Russian 






Federation. However, Russian companies will need more technology and capital 
to fully retain these resources, which creates new possibilities of joint ventures 
between Russians, Chinese and Western companies– like BP, Shell and even 
Brazilian Petrobras (Jakobson 2010, 8-9).  
Thereby, exploitation of these natural resources in the Arctic will 
depend upon a major flow of investments and technology. In this sense, China's 
position for occupying an important position in the regional scene is quite 
positive, once this country has a fair amount of capital reserve and is apt for 
investing abroad. An example that rests closer to the Brazilian reality and 
demonstrates the great Chinese necessity for oil in the future was the partaking 
of Chinese state-owned CNPC and CNOOC – next to Petrobras, Shell and Total 
–in the consortium that won the bid in the auction of Libra pre-salt oil field. 
Thus, the Chinese involvement in this consortium must be understood not only 
in reason of its interest in the pledged pre-salt oil reserves, but also because of 
the acquisition of deep-water drilling technology. 
 
 
4. Opening of new maritime routes 
The phenomenon of defrost in the Arctic will lead to other effects, besides those 
related to the utilization of the natural resources in the region. The melting of 
the ice will cause, initially, the opening of two new economic maritime routes: 
the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. There is, still, the 
possibility of a third alternative, called the Transpolar Route. 
The Northwest Passage consists of at least four possible routes through 
the “Canadian Arctic Archipelago”, a group of more than 19,000 islands and 
rocks connecting the north of the Pacific Ocean, throughout the Bering Strait – 
with its 52 nautical miles of maximum aperture and depth varying between 30 
and 50 meters – along 1,500 kilometers until reaching the Baffin Bay and the 
Davis Strait, located between Canada and Greenland. The Northwest Passage 
shortens the distance between East Asia and the North Atlantic in 
approximately 7,000 kilometers (Roston 2009, 451; Spears 2009, 11). 
The Northern Sea Route, in turn, crosses the Russian arctic seas – 
Barents, Kara, Laptev, Eastern Siberian and Chukchi –in the 
West/Eastdirection. As it occurs in the Northwest Passage, in the Northern Sea 
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Routes several different pathways are available, depending on the ice 
conditions. The most common route is located next to the Russian coast. 
Supported by the Russian ports, this route is mainly used for coastal shipping. 
The farther away from the Russian coast, the most appropriate the routes 
should be for the traffic of shipments, since the distances get shorter. However, 
ice conditions are also more severe, and the maritime routes remain blocked 
most of the time. Accordingly, ships would have to be escorted by icebreakers, a 
situation in which the speed of the transport is drastically reduced becoming, 
thus, economically unviable. Taking into account the shrinkage of Arctic ice, 
the potential use of the Northern Sea Route is unlocked. Then, a trip from 
Shanghai to Hamburg throughout this route is around 6,400 kilometers shorter 
than through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal (Xu et al 2011, 543-549). 
Between August and September 2009, two German ferries for heavy 
loads carried a load of steel pipes from Arkhangelsk (Russian Federation) to 
Nigeria going through the Northern Sea Route, cutting the distance in some 
5,500 kilometers and reducing the use of fuel in 200 tons per ship, which saved 
approximately US$ 600,000. In the following year, a ship with a flag from Hong 
Kong transported iron ore from Kirkenes (Norway) to Shanghai making use of 
the same route and reducing the costs in around US$180,000. In 2012, forty-six 
ships carried more than 1.2 million tons of cargos through the Northern Sea 
Route, an increase in 53% when compared to the previous year. Some analysts 
estimate that until 2020 around 30 million tons of shipments will go through 
this route (Guschin 2013). 
The Transpolar Route would cross the Atlantic Ocean “through its 
middle”, outside the jurisdiction of any state in the region, which means, on the 
high seas. Accordingly to the UNCLOS, there is no restriction imposed on high 
seas navigation and the vessel is subject only to the laws of its flag.  There never 
was any considerable commercial interest in the Transpolar Route, mainly due 
the great barrier of permanent ice in the Arctic Ocean. The lack of salt in these 
frozen layers produces an even thicker layer of ice. Even so, most commercial 
navigation companies do not disregard future plans for making use of this route. 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) – a specialized United Nations 
agency that establishes the standards for international maritime navigation – 
has been working on the adoption of a Polar Code with the main goal of 






standardizing the minimum requirements for building commercial ships that 
intend to navigate on the Arctic waters (Spears 2009, 11-12). 
In the future, the opening of these new commercial maritime routes 
would bring additional advantages, besides considerably shortening the distance 
and saving fuel. First, it opens the possibility of navigation for all those Post-
Panamax vessels, which means the ones that, due its large size, cannot make use 
of the Panama Canal. The second additional factor is the considerable reduction 
in the insurance costs. Because of piracy in the horn of Africa, insurance costs 
for ships that go through the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal have 
increased ten times since September 2008 and March 2009 (Jakobson 2010, 5; 
Xu et al 2010, 559). 
Even though the opening of these new maritime routes brings a series of 
advantages, especially the Northern Sea Route – from Eastern China to 
Western Europe – some disadvantages shall be considered. The lack of 
infrastructure and the adverse conditions might impede the commercial usage of 
the routes, at least in the short term. Single ice blocks will remain a serious 
problem, even during the periods in which the passage is considered free of ice. 
There will be a tendency for increasing the number of icebergs, especially 
resulting from the ice melting in Greenland, which shall force the ships to 
decrease even more their speed and to take detours. Moreover, the shallow 
depth in some parts of the routes, especially in the Bering Strait, might impose 
a problem for large freighters. At last, there remains the distrust in front of the 
possibility that the Russian might charge exorbitant service taxes in the 
Northern Sea Route (Jakobson 2010, 8). 
For a nation the size of China, which is a great importer and exporter 
and that has a large amount of its commerce going through maritime routes (at 
least 50% of this country's GDP relies on maritime navigation), new 
alternatives for maritime traffic arouse great interest. In reason of this 
dependency on international navigation for its economic development, any 
change in these routes has a direct impact for Chinese economy. Thus, opening 
the Arctic Ocean presents a unique opportunity for China and also for 
international trade in general, since almost 90% of it happens through the sea 
(Spears 2009, 10). 
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5. The main Chinese actions: bilateral and multilateral strategies 
Chinese interest in the Polar Regions started in the beginning of the 1980s. In 
1981 was created the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) and 
two years later the country became part of the Antarctic Treaty, turning into 
an advisory member of the Treaty in 1985. The first Chinese base in Antarctica 
(“The Great Wall Station”) was installed this same year, and a second base 
(Zhongshan) was built in 1989 (CAA 2014). 
Chinese presence in the North Pole, however, relies upon a considerable 
diplomatic effort. Since China is a non-Arctic state, its presence in the region 
has to be conducted together with other states in the region. This need, thus, 
leads the Chinese to conduct their policy for the Arctic with a double strategic-
diplomatic bias: bilateral and multilateral. 
 
5.1. Chinese bilateral strategy for the Arctic 
In bilateral terms, Chinese interest in the Arctic issues involves a closer 
relationship with two countries in the region: Iceland and Denmark.  
As a consequence of the economic collapse that happened in Iceland in 
2008, China has focused considerable attention on this country. In 2010, it 
made available to Iceland the amount of US$500 million, through a current 
swap operation, for helping in the reconstruction of Iceland's crashed bank 
system. Besides that, analysts of the Arctic region share the belief that because 
of global warming, Iceland will become the most important logistic axis in the 
region. In April 2012, Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Wen Jibao, in a visit to 
Reykjavik, signed several bilateral agreements, including a free trade agreement 
between the two countries – the first of this kind with a European country –as 
well as a framework treaty for Arctic cooperation. Another important feature of 
this relation is that China possesses in the Icelandic capital the biggest foreign 
embassy of the country. In retribution, Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardotir, 
showed her support for giving China the status of Permanent Observer member 
in the Arctic Council (Rainwater 2013, 72).  
Chinese presence in the region is not restricted solely to the role of the 
government. For instance, magnate Huang Nubo recently announced an 
investment in the range of US$100 million in order to build a resort and a golf 
field in Grimsstadir, Northern Iceland. His announcement engendered certain 






suspicions, given the climate conditions in the region, which are adverse to the 
practice of this sport (NYT 2013). 
The Danish also started to openly support the Chinese application as a 
Permanent Observer in the Arctic Council. It happened mainly after the 
signature of several agreements between Denmark and China that together sum 
up to US$740 million in the fields of “green economy”, agriculture and food 
security. The Danish support overlaps with the Chinese interest for investing in 
the region of Greenland – still a province of Denmark – that controls important 
deposits of rare earth metals, uranium, iron ore, lead ore, zinc, gemstones and 
oil (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 85). 
In January 2013, also Sweden and Norway started to support the 
Chinese application as a permanent observer member in the Arctic Council – 
even with the disagreements raised after the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace 
Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Other factor that guides Chinese 
financial help to small countries in the region is its particular interest in 
developing large infrastructure works, such as construction of harbors, ships 
repair stations, transportation hubs and rescuing centers. These are necessary in 
order to make possible the use of the Arctic routes throughout most time of the 
year (Guschin 2013). 
The relations with the larger countries in the Arctic –Canada, the 
United States and the Russian Federation – are also considered positive, even 
though arousing more suspicions. For Canada, for example, it would be well 
received if China recognized the full sovereignty of the former over the 
“Canadian Arctic Archipelago”, the broad group of islands located in the 
Northwest Passage. The Chinese, together with the United States, are reluctant 
to accept the Northwest Passage as a historical Canadian possession, 
understanding this route is an international strait, thus subject to the regime of 
transit passage, as stated in the terms of the UNCLOS (Wright 2011b, 2). 
 
5.2. Chinese multilateral strategy for the Arctic 
Chinese strategy for approaching matters of the Arctic has prioritized scientific 
diplomacy by means of cooperation with the eight countries in the region. Since 
the 1990s, China has developed an intense project for the Polar Regions, with 
the creation of the Polar Research Institute of China, coordinated by CAA. In 
China also looks towards the Arctic v.3, n.6. Jul./Dec. 2014 
 
106  
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations | v.3, n.6, Jul./Dec. 2014 
 
1997, this country bought the Ukrainian icebreaker vessel Xuelong (“Snow 
Dragon”), which already took part in four scientific expeditions in the Arctic 
region since 1999. Besides, in 2004, China established its first permanent Arctic 
base called Huanghe (“Yellow River”) in Ny-Ålesund, in the archipelago of 
Svalbard, Norway3. One of the purposes of the scientific station is to monitor 
climate change in the Arctic and its effects over the terrestrial and marine 
Chinese environment. More recently, in 2011, the Chinese government decided 
to invest US$300 million to build a second icebreaker ship to increase the 
support in the research projects in the Polar Regions. With two icebreakers the 
expectation is that polar expeditions could last more than 200 days a year 
(Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012, 81-82). 
Moreover, since 1996 China has participated as a member of the 
International Arctic Science Committee, which promotes interdisciplinary 
researches over the Arctic and its global impacts. Chinese scientists have made 
its presence at international forums on the Arctic environment, such as the 
Arctic Science Summit Week and the International Polar Year Program 
(Rainwater 2013, 71). 
The strategy of multilateral scientific cooperation showed important 
advances in December 2013, when it was launched in Shanghai the China-
Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC), a partnership between the Polar 
Research Institute of China (PRIC) and other six Nordic institutions. CNARC 
establishes an academic platform of cooperation to increase awareness, 
understanding and knowledge over the Arctic and its global impacts, promoting 
cooperation for sustainable development in the Nordic Arctic and a harmonious 
development for China in the global context. Also, the country carried out five 
scientific expeditions in the Arctic (in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2010 and 2012), 
covering areas like the ocean, snow and ice, atmosphere, biology and geology. It 
is common the presence of scientists from other countries of the region during 
Chinese scientific missions in the Arctic (Arctic Center 2013). 
                                                 
3 The Svalbard Treaty (or Spitsbergen Treaty) was signed in February 1920 during the Versailles peace 
process. Because of this Treaty, the signatory countries recognized the sovereignty of Norway over the 
archipelago, even though certain limitations still remain, especially related to the fair use of fishing 
and hunting resources, as stated in the original text that “shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and 
hunting in the territories”. China is part on this treaty since July 1925. 






However, the main action defined by Beijing in order to increase its 
presence in the North Pole is to become an observer member in the Arctic 
Council. As seen, the Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental board, 
founded in 1996, that consolidated the efforts of cooperation among countries in 
the region after the end of the Cold War. The Arctic Council defines three 
categories of membership: i) the members – only the eight countries in the 
Arctic Region (A-8); ii) the permanent members – entities representing the 
native people of the region, currently numbering six4; and, iii) the observers –
non-Arctic states, regional, global, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary 
organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations.  
The forum held its first meeting in September 1998, in Canada. The 
presidency rotates among its members every two years and the biannual 
meetings happen in the country that is holding the presidency at each time. The 
last meeting was in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013, closing up the first round in 
which every country has already presided the Arctic Council and starting a 
second round with the Canadian presidency for the 2013-2015 years. 
According to what is established in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, 
establishing and regulating the Arctic Council, the status of observer is given to 
those states and entities that as understood by the Council “are able to 
contribute with its work”.  The membership as observer requires the consensus 
among all eight members (A-8). Therefore, the candidates to observer 
membership shall meet certain criteria: i) accept and support the objectives of 
the Arctic Council as defined in the Ottawa Declaration; ii) recognize that the 
Arctic states hold the sovereignty, rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
the Arctic; iii) recognize the existence of a wide legal framework that applies to 
the Arctic including, especially, the international law of the seas, and that this 
framework provides a solid basis for the responsible management of the Arctic 
Ocean.  
China's search for a seat as permanent observer member in the Arctic 
Council is based upon the argument that climate change had impacts over the 
                                                 
4The current permanent members are the following: Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Aleut 
International Association (AIA), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON) and Saami Council. 
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environment, both at the regional and global level, thus justifying its 
participation in the governance of the region. 
In 2007, China was admitted as an ad hoc observer in the Arctic 
Council, a vulnerable position that was renewed in the meetings of 2009 and 
2011. Since decisions in the scope of the Arctic Council must be taken by 
consensus among state members, any of them could veto Chinese participation. 
Aware of its condition, China's pledge has demanded great bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic effort. 
In January 2013, a few months before the biannual meeting of the 
Arctic Council, Chinese ambassador Zhao Jun was invited to speak during the 
conference named Arctic Frontiers, annually held in the city of Tromsø, 
Norway. In his speech Ambassador Zhao emphasized the preeminent role that 
the Arctic Council has, besides acknowledging the sovereignty and the sovereign 
rights of the Arctic states: 
 
China considers the Arctic Council as the most important regional 
inter‐governmental forum to discuss issues of environmental protection and 
sustainable development in the Arctic. […] China respects the sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states, attaches importance 
to the Arctic scientific research and environmental protection, and supports 
the principles and objectives of the Arctic Council. 
 
In May 2013, during the meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, the Chinese 
request to become a full observer was accepted. China's admittance in this 
position does not reduce the power held by the A-8 group, since observer 
members5 do not vote, being able only to join the discussion and exercising the 
right of speech during the sessions. However, it was not a trivial diplomatic 
victory, especially when one considers that another important candidate had its 
application denied, namely the European Union.  
The lack of a voting power for China in the Arctic Council was deemed 
unimportant by Qu Xing, director of the China Institute of International 
                                                 
5The other permanent observer states in the Arctic Council are Germany, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, 
France, Italy, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom.  






Studies, who believes that China can direct its influence throughout bilateral 
actions and increase the transparency and equity in the themes related to the 
Arctic region. Besides, Qu understands that the Chinese admission as a 
permanent observer member demonstrates that the Chinese activities were 
acknowledged by all members of A-8 (Xinhua Insight 2013). 
Many scholars point out that the current institutional structure to deal 
with the issues surrounding the Arctic is insufficient in order to face the severe 
challenges on sustainable development in the region. However, the great 
majority of scholars believe that changes in this structure in the short- or even 
medium-range future seem unlikely, given the complexity and the relatively 
recent nature of the broad Arctic cooperation (Vanderzwaag, Huebert and 
Ferrara 2002, 166-171). 
Thereby, the possibility of taking part in the Arctic Council, even if just 
as a permanent observer member, ensures to the Chinese a stable position in the 
most important intergovernmental forum on the region. The Arctic Council has 
gained undeniable importance in the last few years. Evidence of this was the 
presence, for the first time, of a North-American Secretary of State in this 
forum – Hillary Clinton in 2011 during the meeting held in Nuuk – an action 




6. A Chinese policy for the Arctic? 
Officially, China denies having an Arctic policy. This was the case, for 
example, when then Deputy Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue, during the forum 
organized by the Norwegian government in Svalbard, in June 2009, 
categorically stated that, “China does not have an Arctic strategy” (apud 
Jakobson 2010, 9). 
                                                 
6Two North-American actions directed to the Arctic deserve to be highlighted: the first was the 
launching of the “National Strategy for the Arctic Region”, in May 2013, signed by President Barack 
Obama. The second was the explicit desire of the Department of State of creating a position of high-
level representative for the Arctic, given the growing importance of this region for the United States. 
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However, Chinese actions in the region hint the contrary. Three 
important statements over the last years (2010, 2012 and 2013) about the Arctic 
can give an interesting Chinese political perspective for the region (Joensen 
2013, 29). 
On July 30, 2010, then representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
–now Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin – made a brief speech presenting 
Chinese interests in the Arctic region during the High North Study Tour event, 
held in Norway. Liu Zhenmin began his speech justifying the reasons that have 
led China to express interest in the Arctic cooperation, which were essentially 
three: the geographical location of China, scientific research and possible 
climate impacts on the country. In the words of Liu himself (2010): 
 
The most northern part of China is around 50 degrees of north latitude. As 
a country located in north hemisphere, China is seriously affected by 
climate and weather in Arctic. […] Arctic is a unique place for global 
climate research and environment assessment. […] In case the Arctic 
shipping routes open someday, global shipping energy activities and trade 
will be affected. We feel we are part of the world, changes in the Arctic will 
affect China. 
 
In a cautious speech and always preaching cooperation between Arctic 
and non-Arctic states, Liu (2010) ended his brief manifestation stating that: 
 
The parties have different rights, interests and specific concerns with 
regard to Arctic-related issues. However, peace, stability and sustainable 
development in the Arctic serve the common interests of both Arctic and 
non-Arctic states. Arctic and non-Arctic states are partners, not 
competitors. We should continue to enhance mutually beneficial and win-
win cooperation, and jointly uphold and promote peace, stability and 
sustainable development in the Arctic region. 
 
The three official Chinese objectives in the Arctic cooperation were 
subsequently ratified by Ambassador Lan Lijun during the meeting between 
the Swedish Presidency of the Arctic Council and the observers – China was not 
yet a permanent observer member – held in November 2012. In line with the 






previous Chinese manifestation on the Arctic, Lan used the expression that 
China is “a near Arctic state” and reinforced the conciliatory tone by stating 
that “The participation ofobservers does not prejudice the dominant role of 
Arctic states in the Council”. On the other hand, 
 
[s]ome of the Arctic issues are trans-regional, such as climate change and 
international shipping, which involve the interests of non-Arctic states. 
Arctic states and non-Arctic states share common interests in addressing 
trans-regional issues and should further their communication and 
cooperation. (apud Lijiang and Chenyuan 2013, 378-380). 
 
The third major Chinese demonstration regarding its attention towards 
the Arctic was the aforementioned speech by Ambassador Zhao Jun, in January 
2013. In addition to highlighting the importance of the Arctic Council for the 
governance of the region, Zhao emphasized the dramatic changes in the region 
in recent decades that will influence the overall scene of navigation, trade and 
energy. Following the line of previous Chinese positions on the Arctic, the 
ambassador stressed that international standards, in particular the Treaty of 
Svalbard and the UNCLOS, created a fundamental legal framework for all 
parties participating in Arctic issues. But Zhao (2013) underscored the Chinese 
position of actively participating in the Arctic cooperation, asserting that: 
 
China holds that this partnership of cooperation should be established on 
the legal basis of recognition and respect of each other’s rights, so as to 
commit ourselves to peace, stability and sustainable development of the 
Arctic. To this end, we must understand and trust each other at the 
political level, and carry out joint research activities to address the 
transregional issues. China will make its own efforts to achieve this goal. 
 
Finally, Ambassador Zhao stated, as did his colleagues previously, the 
Chinese geographical position of about 50 degrees of north latitude and placed 
China as “near Arctic state”. 
As mentioned before, the cautious but persistent effort, to seek a seat as 
a permanent observer member of the Arctic Council, had a positive outcome in 
May 2013. Over a year later, China has essentially followed the same 
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“unwritten Arctic policy”, seeking closer approximation with smaller countries 
in the region, especially Iceland and the Danish province of Greenland, and a 
positive relationship, but perhaps not as close, with larger Arctic states. But, 
either with the former or with the latter, it keeps reinforcing the discourse of 
scientific cooperation, given the unique conditions of the North Pole. 
Having its seat secured in the Arctic Council, a fluent relationship with 
regional states and a constant presence in the North Pole, through its scientific 
research, the Arctic policy of China can move to a more proactive stance within 
Arctic’s international legal and political mechanisms. This is the view of Li 
Zhenfu: 
 
[A]ctive participation in the formulations, revisions, and improvements of 
international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs is an effective avenue 
and the best choice for realizing China’s Arctic sea route rights and 
interests imperatives, accelerating its economic and social development, 
bringing into play China’s functions as a responsible major power in the 
international arena, and hastening the rationalization and democratization 
of international relations. (apud Wright 2011a, 18) 
 
The outlook is that China will strengthen its position in the region, from 
a cautious diplomatic behavior to a more active attitude, now that the country 
gained its own space to present its views. Therefore, the expectation is that 





The first stage of China’s “unwritten Arctic policy” seems to have achieved its 
goals: permanent access to the Arctic Council, dialogue with the A-8 and 
consolidation of its presence in the region. The cautious diplomatic strategy of 
finding its own place in the discussions on the Arctic proved positive. 
As shown above, the Chinese interest in the region stems from a 
scientific perspective of monitoring the effects of climate change and the 
melting of the ice sheet in its regional and global impact. However, it is 
undeniable the great economic appeal that the North Pole also has on China, be 






it in the exploitation of mineral wealth or with the opening of new maritime 
trade routes. 
Although Beijing has not explicated an Arctic policy, the commitment 
and consistent manifestation of some of its officials indicate a path of 
consolidation and strengthening of its new position as a full observer member of 
the Arctic Council, in addition to deepening bilateral ties with certain Arctic 
states. It is reasonable to imagine that China’s political position will become 
more active in the coming years, though hardly “aggressive”, particularly in 
light of the need to cooperate with all stakeholders in the Arctic: Arctic and 
non-Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and international and non-governmental 
organizations. 
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This article analyzes the current political and strategic situation in the Arctic, 
giving special attention to Chinese interests on the region. First, it introduces 
the geopolitical background in the North Pole considering the current 
international framework. Second, the work investigates the two main 
components that draw Chinese attention to the region: exploitation of mineral 
resources and opening of new commercial maritime routes. Later, this work 
describes the main actions that China is taking in order to become an important 
player in the Arctic, both with bilateral and multilateral strategies. At last, it 
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